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Abstract
As  part  of  a  discussion  of  models  of  competition  through  the  spectrum  from  monopolies  to  perfect
competition  undergraduate  economics  students  are  introduced  to  two  stylised  models  of  markets
devised by Bertrand and Cournot. This paper compares the two models. In textbooks revenue maximiza-
tion for  each  firm  in a  market  is  achieved by  producing  until  marginal  revenue  equals  marginal  cost.
Under  the Bertrand  model  firms are price  takers so firms produce  up until  the point that  price equals
marginal  cost.  Under  the  Cournot  model,  even  in  a  perfectly  competitive  market–where  it  is  implied
that all value is captured–marginal revenue can never equal price.
Introduction
As  part  of  a  discussion  of  models  of  competition  through  the  spectrum  from  monopolies  to  perfect
competition  undergraduate  economics  students  are  introduced  to  two  stylised  models  of  markets
devised  by  Bertrand and  Cournot.  This  paper  compares  the  two models.  The validity  of  the textbook
models of how supply relates to demand will be considered separately.
We will  consider  the standard  textbook model of  a market  in which  price P  varies linearly  with total
quantity Q produced by N  firms competing in the market:
(1)   P = A - BQ A, B > 0
Because P is a function of N  variables it must be plotted in N + 1 dimensions. For example a duopoly
requires a three dimensional  plot of P  versus q1  and q2  as shown below in Fig. 1.  To enable a visual
representation of the accompanying mathematics we will stick with the case of a duopoly.
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Fig. 1   Illustration of price versus quantity for a duopoly market.
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The total quantity Q is the sum of the output of all N  competing firms:
(2)   
Q = q1 + q2 + … + qi +… + qN
= ‚
i=1
N
qi
where  lower  case  variables  are  used  throughout  this  paper  to indicate  variables  and  constants  associ-
ated with  the firm and  upper  case to indicate  variables and  constants  for  the entire  market.  The reve-
nue, ri , of firm i is defined as price times quantity (ri ª Pqi ) and marginal revenue HmrLi  of firm i as its
derivative
(3)   HmrLi = dHPqi LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅdqi = P + qi dPÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅdqi
Bertrand price competition
In Bertrand price competition each firm in the market adjusts  its output qi . In an N  firm market, price
is therefore a function of N  variables:
(4)   P = f Hq1 , q2 , q3 , …, qN L
and the revenue earned by firm i is
(5)   ri = qi f Hq1 , q2 , q3 , …, qN L
Because  price  P  is  a  function  of  more  than  one  variable,  analysis  of  Bertrand  competition  requires
partial derivatives. In order to use a graphical representation later on we will restrict ourselves for now
to the case of a duopoly. To determine the slope of each firms demand curve, assuming Bertrand price
competition, we begin by taking the differential form of price
(6)   dP = dq1 J ∂PÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ∂q1 N + dq2 J ∂PÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ∂q2 N
Therefore
(7)   dPÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq1
= J ∂PÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
∂q1
N+ dq2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq1
J ∂PÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
∂q2
N
In the Bertrand model while the quantities  q1  and q2  vary as the two firms compete the total  quantity
produced  by  the  duopoly  market,  Q,  is  assumed  to  be  constant  for  a  given  value  of  P,  therefore
q2 = Q - q1 , so that
(8)   dq2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq1
= -1
Therefore eqn (7)  becomes
(9)   dPÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq1
= J ∂PÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
∂q1
N- J ∂PÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
∂q2
N = 0
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It follows that
(10)   dPÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq2
= J ∂PÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
∂q2
N- J ∂PÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
∂q1
N = 0
Equations (9) and (10) are equivalent to the textbook statement that under consitions of price competi-
tion firms are price takers and have a demand slope of zero, i.e. marginal revenue equals price.
Also since Q = f Hq1 , q2 L:
(11)   dQ = dq1J ∂QÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ∂q1 N + dq2 J ∂QÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ∂q2 N
and it follows that
(12)   
dQ
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq1
= J ∂QÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
∂q1
N- J ∂QÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
∂q2
N
= 0
Alternatively we can arrive at this conclusion by applying the chain rule to the demand function of the
firm to get
(13)   
dP
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq1
=
dP
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dQ
dQ
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq1
= 0
Since  HdP êdQL ≠ 0  it  follows  that  dQ êdq1  must  be  zero.  To  visually  see  the  horizontal  inverse
demand  for  the  firm,  in  other  words  to  see  where  the  dP ê dq1 = 0  comes  from,  you  must  take  a
diagonal  slice  of  Fig.  1  corresponding  to  the  case  where  the  industry  quantity,  Q,  is  fixed.  This  is
shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2   A ‘constant Q’ slice through the P versus  q1  and q2  plot.
Figure 2 shows a diagonal ‘constant Q’ slice through the P versus  q1  and q2  plot. Both  q1  and q2  vary
along the line  where the  shaded plane intersects  or slices through the  3D plot of P  versus   q1  and q2
however  the  total  quantity  Q  is  constant.  This  represents  a  case  corresponding  to  Bertrand  price
competition  in  which  the  inverse  demand  for  the  firm is  horizontal.  For  simplicity  if  we assume  that
the  marginal  cost  is  zero,  as  is  customary  in  textbook  examples,  the  intersection  of  price  versus
marginal cost, QM , occurs at
(14)   N A - BQ = 0
therefore QM  is
(15)   QM =
A
ÅÅÅÅÅ
B
Cournot quantity competition
Cournot began his derivation [1] by initially considering a duopoly, P = f Hq1 , q2 L. Cournot’s assump-
tion was that each firm would assume that the output of the other firms was fixed: 
“…Proprietor (1) can have no direct influence on the determination of q2 : all that he can do,
when q2  has  been determined  by  proprietor  (2),  is  to choose for  q1  the  value which  is  best
for him. This he will be able to accomplish by properly adjusting his price, except as propri-
etor (2), who, seeing himself forced to accept his price and this value of q1 , may adopt a new
value for q2 , more favourable to his interests than the preceding one.” [1].
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Cournot then writes:
(16)   dHq1 f Hq1 , q2 LLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq1
= f Hq1 , q2 L + q1 d f Hq1 , q2 LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅdq1 = 0
and
(17)   dHq2 f Hq1 , q2 LLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq2
= f Hq1 , q2 L + q2 d f Hq1 , q2 LÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅdq2 = 0
The final value of q1  and q2  are obtained by solving eqns (16) and (17) and is given in undergraduate
textbooks (q1 = q2 ). Cournot then adds eqns (16) and (17) and substitutes f Hq1 , q2 L = f HQL  to give
(18)   2 f HQL + q2 d f HQLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅdq2 + q1 d f HQLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅdq1 = 0
The chain rule,
(19)   d f HQLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq
=
d f HQL
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dQ
dQ
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq
,
is then applied and some rearrangement gives:
(20)   2 f HQL + Q d f HQLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dQ
= 0
Substituting P = f HQL into eqn (20) and re-arranging gives
(21)   Q + 2P dQÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dP
= 0
For N  competitors in the market eqns (16) and (17) are replaced by
(22)   
f HQL + q1 d f HQL êdQ = 0
f HQL + q2 d f HQL êdQ = 0
ª
f HQL + qN d f HQL êdQ = 0
where the solution yields q1 = q2 = … = qN  and eqn (21) is replaced by the more general
(23)   Q + NP dQÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dP
= 0
Equation (23) describes how the total quantity produced in a market varies with the number of firms N .
For the textbook example of a market described by eqn (1) (i.e. dP êdQ = -B) the solution to equation
becomes:
(24)   Q - HA - BQL NÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
B
= 0,
which gives:
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(25)   Q = N AÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
BH1 + NL
The  point  at  which  the  inverse  demand  curve  intersects  the  marginal  cost  curve  can  be  found  by
equating  price  and  marginal  cost.  For  simplicity  if  we  assume  that  the  marginal  cost  is  zero,  as  is
customary in textbook examples of Cournot competition, the intersection, QM , occurs at
(26)   QM =
A
ÅÅÅÅÅÅ
B
Comparing  eqns  (25)  and  (26)  it  can  be  seen  that  as  the  number  of  firms  competing  in  the  market
increases Q Ø QM . This is best illustrated graphically:
Q
P
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 5
N = 8
N = 20
Fig. 3   Plot of P versus Q showing market output under the Cournot model for various numbers 
of firms competing in a market.
Marginal revenue for the market can be calculated and plotted. We see in Fig. 3 that as the number of
firms  N  increases  the  quantity  Q  produced  increases  and  for  very  large  N  both  Q  and  P  approach
values expected for the case of perfect competition.
In Cournot  competition  Cournot’s  assumption was that  in an N  firm market  each firm would assume
that the output  of the other firms was fixed therefore price for each firm is a function of one variable
only, the quantity produced by that firm, qi .
(27)   P = f Hqi L
and the revenue earned by firm i is
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(28)   ri = qi f Hqi L
The example of Cournot quantity competition usually presented in economics textbooks is usually the
case of a duopoly.  The case of a duopoly can be readily illustrated graphically.  In a duopoly Cournot
quantity  competition  is  represented  by taking slices  parallel  to one  of the  quantity  axes of  Fig.  1.  An
example of this is shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4   Illustration of price versus quantity for a duopoly market. The slice parallel to the q1  axis 
shows the Cournot quantity competition model in which the output of firm 2 is assumed fixed.
Assuming a constant  q2  the slope of P versus q1  is negative not horizontal.  Adding more firms to the
market won't change this. For example, under the Cournot model, for a duopoly we have:
(29)   P = A - Bq1 - Bq2
The revenue of firm 1 is
(30)   r1 = q1 A - BHq1 L2 - Bq1 q2
Therefore, for a duopoly, the marginal revenue for firm 1, HmrL1 , is
(31)   HmrL1 = A - 2Bq1 - Bq2
= P - Bq1
In other words the marginal revenue is a linear function of q1  with slope -2B. This is easily extended:
for example if three firms were competing price would be given by
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(32)   P = A - Bq1 - Bq2 - Bq3
and the marginal revenue for firm 1 is
(33)   HmrL1 = A - 2Bq1 - Bq2 - Bq3
= P - Bq1
Again the marginal revenue is a linear function of q1  with slope -2B. We can keep adding firms to the
market so that for N  firms competing
(34)   P = A - Bq1 - Bq2 - Bq3 - … - BqN
Because  of  Cournot’s  assumption  was  that  each  firm  would  assume  that  the  output  of  the  other  firm
was fixed, adding more firms to the market  is, from the point of view of each individual firm, adding
constants to the equation so that the marginal revenue of firm 1 is
(35)   HmrL1 = A - 2Bq1 - Bq2 - Bq3 - … - BqN
So that the marginal revenue is again a linear function of q1  with slope -2B.
It  is  clear  from  eqn  (35)  that  regardless  of  the  number  of  firms  competing  in  a  market,  whether  the
number  be  two  or  approaching  infinity,  the  slope  of  the  marginal  revenue  curve  remains  unchanged
and is never zero meaning that the demand curve for each firm is not horizontal under Cournot competi-
tion under any  circumstances  and  that price never equals  marginal  revenue under  the Cournot  model.
Under this model the slope of the marginal revenue curve is always -2B even in an N Ø ¶ market in
which  the  market  as  a  whole  may  be  considered  to  be  perfectly  competitive  in  so  far  as  the  market
price and quantity  produced as the values expected for  perfect competition (eg.  Fig.  3).  In fact under
the Cournot model there is only one scenario under which price equals marginal revenue for firm i and
that is if the firm does not produce, i.e. qi = 0. If we are to assume that the firm is actually producing
goods, i.e. qi ≠ 0, then HmrLi ≠ P and the firms demand curve is not horizontal, dP êdqi ≠ 0.
A more direct way at arriving at this conclusion may be by differentiating Q  with respect to qi  which
gives
(36)   dQÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dqi
= 1
Applying the chain rule we get
(37)   
dP
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dqi
=
dP
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dQ
dQ
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dqi
=
dP
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dQ
A  common  (and  correct)  assertion  that  one  comes  across  is  that  as  N  increases  marginal  revenue
approaches  price.  This  is  unfortunately  often  misinterpreted  as  meaning  that  the  slope  of  each  firms
demand  curve  is  (actually  approaches)  zero  and  therefore  its  marginal  revenue  curve  is  (approaches)
zero so that the two are equivalent. This is what occurs in the Bertrand model. Stigler discussed this in
a  review  of  perfect  competition  many  years  ago  [2].  Beginning  with  the  definition  of  the  marginal
revenue of the firm Stigler writes that
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(38)   dHPqLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq
= P +
dP
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq
After applying the chain rule and noting that dQ êdq = 1, which is in agreement with Cournot, eqn (38)
Stigler writes:
(39)   dHPqLÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dq
= P + q
dP
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
dQ
Equation (39) shows that under Cournots model marginal revenue will only equal  price at the limit of
very  small  values  of  q  which  is  the  limit  of  an  extremely  large  number  of  firms  competing  in  the
market.  So  Stigler’s  analysis  is  that  marginal  revenue  equals  price  for  N Ø ¶,  q Ø 0  because  the
difference between the left hand side and right hand side of eqn (39) is infinitesimally small. Neverthe-
less it is self evident that the slope of the marginal revenue curve as defined by eqn (35) can never be
zero just as eqn (37), which Stigler uses as in his derivation, shows that the slope of the demand curve
for the firm can never be zero.
This therefore represents an important difference between Cournot and Bertrand competition models at
the level of each individual competing firm.
Revenue maximization for the firm
While on the face of it the difference between Cournot and Bertrand competition models at the level of
each  individual  competing  firm  may seem  trivial  it  has  implication  for  prescriptive  advice  offered  to
undergraduates  on  how  firms  can  maximise  revenues.  Revenue  maximization  is  achieved  by  a  firm
producing  until  marginal  revenue  equals  marginal  cost.  Under  the  Bertrand  model  since  marginal
revenue equals  price it  is  usually  stated that  revenue  maximization is achieved  when a firm produces
up until  the point that price equals marginal  cost.  If this prescription were to be offered in a competi-
tive  market  described  by  Cournot  quantity  competition  each  firm  would  produce  twice  its  profit
maximizing quantities since marginal  revenue is never equal to price and in fact the marginal revenue
curve intersects  the marginal  cost  curve at half the quantity of where the price intersects  the marginal
cost curve.
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